The enlargement of the European Union provides a unique opportunity to study the impact of the lifting of migration restrictions on the migrant sending countries. With EU enlargement in 2004, 1.2 million workers from Eastern Europe emigrated to the UK and Ireland. I use this emigration wave to show that emigration signicantly changed the wage distribution in the sending country, in particular between young and old workers. Using a novel dataset from Lithuania, the UK and Ireland for the calibration of a structural model of labor demand, I nd that over the period of ve years emigration increased the wages of young workers by 6%, while it had no eect on the wages of old workers. Contrary to the immigration literature, there is no signicant eect of emigration on the wage distribution between high-skilled and low-skilled workers.
Introduction
Lifting the barriers to migration can lead to welfare gains of up to 150% of world GDP.
1 However, while a large body of literature has quantied the gains from migration for the receiving countries and the migrants, little is known about the impact of emigration on the sending countries. Given that migration is heavily restricted, there are few episodes of large migration waves that can be exploited to assess the impact of the lifting of these restrictions on the sending countries. To estimate the wage eects of emigration, I use a structural factor demand model (Card & Lemieux, 2001; Borjas, 2003) . I rst take a snapshot of the labor market prior to EU enlargement by estimating the model parameters using microdata from Lithuania. Based on observed immigration data from the UK and Ireland, I then simulate the emigration wave and calculate the wage change as the dierence between the equilibrium wage before and after the migration wave.
Compared to a reduced-form analysis, this approach allows me to isolate the eect of emigration from other factors that would otherwise impact wages, such as trade, FDI and TFP growth. Furthermore, it also delivers separate wage eects for groups of workers with dierent education and work experience, thus allowing for an assessment of the distributional impact of emigration.
The main nding is that emigration had a signicant impact on the wage structure, and particularly on the wage distribution between old and young workers, causing a substantial wage increase for young workers yet no eect on the wages of old workers. By contrast, I nd no 1 Clemens (2011). 2 See Kerr & Kerr (2011) for a review of the immigration literature. Estimates for the gains on the side of the emigrants can be found in Chiswick (1978) , Borjas (1995) , and Algan et al. (2010) . 3 Own calculations from work permit data. dierence in the wage eects between high-and low-skilled workers. These wage eects can be decomposed into an own-wage eect, caused by the emigration of workers with the same observable characteristics, and general equilibrium eects, caused by the change in the skill distribution of the workforce. The own-wage eect is positive; namely, a decrease in the number of workers increases their wage, while the sum of the general equilibrium eects, caused by the change in the demographics of the workforce, is negative. The own-wage eect dominates for young workers, who represented the majority of emigrants, while for older workers the two eects cancel each other out.
These ndings stress the importance of labor market externalities in the assessment of the welfare impacts of emigration. Eastern Europe experienced a large outow of young workers a youth drain from all education levels. Through the price mechanism of the labor market, the wages of young workers increased more than the wages of older workers. However, most literature on the sending countries assumes away these labor market eects, focusing instead on the human capital externalities. In this literature, high-skilled emigration changes the incentives of non-migrants to invest in education, which can have a negative brain drain or a positive brain gain eect (Gibson & McKenzie, 2011; Docquier & Rapoport, 2012) on economic growth. While indirect eects may be important for developing countries, this paper nds that the direct wage eects of emigration play a signicant role in middle-income countries.
Given that the emigration wave from Eastern Europe was a sudden shock to labor supply, it allows for the identication of a short-run eect on wages. Moreover, the results have a clear interpretation, since all migrants left within a short period in time. By contrast, previous studies on the wage eect of emigration by Mishra (2007) and Aydemir & Borjas (2007) focus on longer time horizons, both nding a positive long-run impact in Mexico between 1970 and 2000. However, the results have to be interpreted as if all workers had left the economy at once, despite actually having left gradually over the last 50 years (Hanson & McIntosh, 2010) . Dustmann et al. (2012) study a case similar to that in this paper emigration from Poland, although the emigration wave in their period of study was rather small, with 2% of the workforce emigrating between 1998 and 2007. Recent evidence from quasi-natural experiments (Elsner, 2013; Gagnon, 2011) shows that emigration increases wages even in the short run. However, both studies use a reduced-form approach, only allowing them to determine an average eect. In this paper, I show that these wage eects only benet the young workers. Moreover, a comparison with the reduced-form results of Elsner (2013) demonstrates the importance of the general equilibrium eects, without which the predicted wage changes would be considerably higher. This paper also highlights the importance of wages as an adjustment channel to labor supply shocks in countries of origin. By contrast, the small eects of immigration on wages in migrantreceiving countries found in most studies imply that other channels are more important. Hanson & Slaughter (2002) and Lewis (2003) nd that labor supply shocks in US states are mainly absorbed within industries. Industries switch to technologies that are more complementary to the increased type of labor, while there is little evidence of a change in the output mix towards goods produced intensively using the type of labor that has increased most (i.e. the Rybczynski eect). Gandal et al. (2004) and González & Ortega (2011) nd similar results for the large immigration waves in Israel and Spain, respectively. Dustmann & Glitz (2011) show that the switching of industries to complementary technologies can be explained by rm entry and exit, given that new rms have no adjustment costs. However, the non-negligible wage eects of emigration found in this paper imply that other adjustment channels must play a lesser role than in receiving countries, with further research required to shed light on this issue.
Finally, this paper reveals that migration aects sending and receiving countries along dierent skill dimensions. In contrast to most studies on immigration, which nd the main distributional eect between high-skilled and low-skilled workers (Borjas, 2003; Manacorda et al., 2011; D'Amuri et al., 2010) , I nd a signicant distributional eect between old and young workers. The wage eect is larger in Eastern Europe than in the main receiving countries, which can be explained by the low degree of substitutability between old and young workers in transition countries: old workers in Eastern Europe were educated under socialism, while young workers received their education in a market economy. Therefore, young workers cannot easily be replaced by old workers, resulting in a stronger reaction of wages on emigration.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a historical overview and stylized facts concerning the emigration wave from Eastern Europe after 2004. Section 3 sets up the structural model. Section 4 describes the data sources that are used for the estimation of the structural parameters in Section 5. Section 6 details the simulation of the migration wave and calculates the wage eects. Section 7 concludes. Figure 1 shows the changes in average real wages for workers in dierent education and experience groups.
Although all groups gained, the wage changes were not spread evenly across groups of workers.
Indeed, young workers with a work experience of up to 20 years gained considerably more than old workers. Furthermore, wage changes were on average larger for low-skilled workers. These uneven wage changes resulted in a change in the wage distribution between young and old workers, and high-and low-skilled workers. In 2004, the GDP in current prices was between EUR 4,800 (Lithuania) and EUR 6,300 (Slovakia), considerably below the average of the old member states with EUR 26,000. Source: Eurostat. Similarly to the wage changes, the emigrant shares were higher for young workers, who were around 3.5 times more likely to emigrate than old workers. Surprisingly, there was little selection of emigrants with respect to the education groups: workers of all three education levels had almost identical emigrant shares, with slightly higher shares among workers with lower secondary education. Certainly, there was no evidence of a brain drain.
The changes in the level and distribution of wages could be caused by numerous factors.
On the supply side, emigration leads to a smaller number of workers, and given constant labor demand, the workers who did not emigrate represent a more scarce resource and consequently their wages increase. On the demand side, domestic and foreign investment, trade integration or TFP growth can have a positive inuence on wages. The structural model outlined in the next section allows me to disentangle the eect of emigration from these other channels.
3
Structural Model
The structural model lays out a system of labor demand curves for workers with dierent observable skills. To model the heterogeneity in observable skills, the workforce is divided into 12 skill groups, dened by education and work experience. Workers with the same observable characteristics are perfect substitutes and compete in the same labor market. Across skill groups, workers with similar skills are closer substitutes than those with fundamentally dierent skills. Emigration of workers of a particular skill group shifts the labor supply, and, given a downward-sloping labor demand curve, increases the wages of the stayers in this skill group. In addition, emigration of workers from one group alters the relative skill supply of the entire workforce, which shifts the labor demand curves of all other groups. The extent of these general equilibrium eects depends on the degree of substitutability between skill groups, and needs to be determined empirically.
Aggregate Production
The notation and analysis in this section follow Card & Lemieux (2001) , Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano & Peri (2012) . The aggregate production function consists of three building blocks.
In Equation (1), physical capital K t , labor L t and total factor productivity A t are combined to produce an aggregate output Q t , which has a price of 1. The second building block, Equation (2) is a CES aggregate of three education groups, which are imperfect substitutes. The third building block, Equation (3) combines workers with the same education yet dierent work experience, which accounts for the dierence in skills between workers of dierent experience levels. The dierence in skills can arise due to old and young workers acquiring their qualications at dierent times, or because old workers may have gathered more experience in their job, and thus have more human capital than younger workers.
α ∈ (0, 1) is the share of labor in aggregate income. The labor force L t , described in Equation (2), consists of three dierent education groups L it where i denotes lower secondary education (10 years of schooling or less), upper secondary education (11-14 years of schooling) and thirdlevel degree (equivalent to B.Sc degree or higher). Each education group consists of four work experience groups L ijt , as described in Equation (3). The eciency weights θ it and γ ijt reect the contribution of each labor input to the overall output of the entire labor force and each education group, respectively, with i θ it = 1 and j γ ijt = 1. The elasticities of substitution between education groups (σ ED ) and experience groups (σ EXP ) are crucial for the further analysis. The lower the value of these parameters, the harder it is to substitute two groups of workers in the production process, and the steeper the demand curves for education and experience groups.
Work experience is calculated as the exposure to the labor market, age − schooling − 6. 9
For the division of an education group into experience groups (j), I choose intervals of 10 years of work experience (0-10 years, 11-20 years, 21-30 years, 31+ years), as the result of a tradeo between many skill groups and many observations per skill group. Shorter intervals allow for a more dierentiated picture of the labor market, despite coming at the cost of a loss in precision. With a given number of observations, a high number of skill groups means that the calculation of the average wage and labor input per skill group are based on a small number of observations, and consequently averages become less precise. Aydemir & Borjas (2011) show that 9
The time spent in school is 10 years for lower secondary education, 12 years for upper secondary education, and 15 years for third-level education.
this attenuation bias can have a signicant impact on the estimates of the structural parameters.
Given the available dataset, the choice of 10-year intervals represents a compromise that reduces attenuation bias whilst allowing for a dierentiated picture of the labor supply and wage changes.
10

Labor Market Equilibrium
Labor markets are perfectly competitive and clear in every period. The real wage w ijt of each skill group L ijt equals its marginal product. Dierentiating ∂Q t /∂L ijt and taking logs yields the labor market equilibrium, described by the log-linear demand curve
where 1 σ EXP is the slope coecient, while all other terms on the right-hand side of equation (4) are intercepts that vary along the dimensions indicated by the indices, i.e. time, education and experience. Any change in one of the factors on the right-hand side alters the marginal product, which leads to a change in the real wage ceteris paribus. Hence, the wage of group ij depends on its own labor supply, as well as the labor supply of all other groups of workers. Therefore, it is not only the absolute scarcity of group ij that determines its wage, but also the relative scarcity of this group compared to all other skill groups.
From equation (4) in all terms on the right-hand side of equation (4) 
log L ijt can be absorbed by dummies and interaction terms. A vector of time dummies absorbs all variation across skill groups over time, while interaction terms between time and education dummies absorb variation within education groups over time. The parameters γ ijt and the labor input L ijt both vary along the dimensions time, education and experience, so that the inclusion of an interaction of the respective dummies would absorb all the variation, and the model would be fully saturated.
However, in this case, 1 σ EXP could not be identied. To circumvent this problem, I assume that the relative productivity of each experience group is constant over time, so that the variation of γ ijt is absorbed by an interaction of education and experience dummies, δ ij and an error term ε ijt . This is a standard assumption in the literature 11 and in the time horizon of 5 years, it is plausible that the relative productivity of an experience group does not fundamentally change.
Moreover, as a robustness check, I add an additional set of time*experience interaction terms to the estimating equation in Section 5.
σ EXP can then be consistently estimated from See Borjas (2003) , Ottaviano & Peri (2012) .
for this lack of suitable emigration data is that there is no legal obligation for migrants in most European countries to de-register once they have emigrated. self-reported, and can thus be subject to a misreporting bias if workers systematically under-or over-report their income. However, a comparison of the average monthly wages in Table 1A with the average monthly wages for men and women working in the private sector from the Lithuanian live register in Table 1C shows that this bias is negligible, as the dierence is minor.
I restrict the sample to private sector workers of working age, i.e. 18-64 years, and exclude public sector workers from the sample, given that wage determination in the public sector is not usually based on the market mechanism of supply and demand, but rather on seniority.
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See Wadensjö (2007) .
Additionally, I drop the following observations: if the variable disposable income is negative, if the socioeconomic status is pensioner or other, and if workers are self-employed or own a farm.
For each worker, the highest obtained degree counts for their classication into one of the education groups lower secondary education, upper secondary education and third-level degree.
Lower secondary education includes all workers with less than a high school degree. Upper secondary school classies all workers with a high school degree that allows them to go to college, as well as workers who obtained a degree less than the equivalent of a B.Sc degree. Third-level degrees are all degrees at least equivalent to a B.Sc and would allow workers to apply for an international M.Sc program.
While this clustering may appear fairly broad, given that the Lithuanian education system oers a variety of educational tracks, 13 these broad categories are necessary to match the characteristics of the stayers with those of the emigrants. The HBS contains 12 education groups, while the data on the emigrants only distinguishes between 5 groups. Furthermore, broad categories ensure that the number of observations within each group is suciently large to allow for the calculation of reliable average wages and emigration numbers. For a more detailed discussion of the construction of education and experience groups, see the Online Appendix A.2.
Irish Census
For 14 Accordingly, this data captures all workers that emigrated from Lithuania to one of those two countries, regardless of how long they stay in the host country. Given that there is no obligation for working to de-register in their home country, it is not possible to measure how many people returned to Lithuania and how much time they spent in the host country. However, double counts are unlikely, as workers retain their PPS and NINo numbers no matter how frequently they move back and forth between Lithuania and Ireland or the UK. The PPS and NINo numbers could actually undercount the number of migrant workers coming to Ireland and the UK, as some workers might not have registered when they came to work for a short period in time or wanted to avoid having to pay income taxes.
However, such workers who only migrated for a short period in time and did not register for that reason can hardly be seen as emigrants, because they were part of the Lithuanian workforce for the entire time. Assessing the number of workers who migrated for a longer period without
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For more information about PPS and NINo, see www.welfare.ie and www.direct.gov.uk registering is dicult, yet it should be small given the high number of migrants who actually did register. In summary, even if the work permit data might slightly undercount the actual number of migrants, for the simulations this means that the actual labor supply shock might be larger, so that the predicted wage changes resulting from emigration are lower than the actual ones.
Calculation of Emigration Rates
To simulate the eect of the migration of dierent skill groups on wages, the labor supply shock ∆L ij L ij has to be quantied for each skill group. This fraction, which can be interpreted as the emigration rate, i.e. the percentage of workers in skill group ij who emigrated, consists of the change in labor supply in a given time span ∆L ij and the number of workers of the same skill group in Lithuania, L ij . 15 L ij can be directly computed from the HBS. Let the sample of a skill group ij contain l = 1, ..., L workers. The number of workers in this skill group is the sum of the
The shift in labor supply ∆L ij cannot be taken directly from the data, but rather needs to be computed from several Irish and UK data sources. This is due to the fact that I have detailed data on Lithuanian migrants living in Ireland from the Irish census, yet only aggregate gures on the migrants coming to the UK. Note that the supply shifts only consist of emigrants, but leave out migrants who came to Lithuania. As this paper focuses on the impact of emigration and it is possible to isolate this eect in the simulations, I do not consider the potentially osetting wage impact of immigration.
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L ij is the average value of L ijt in the years t = 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006 .
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The UK labor force survey, the most accessible quarterly representative survey of the workforce in the UK, cannot be used to extract reliable data on the skill distribution of a particular country, due to the low number of observations per country. construction sector and immigrants in the UK more in the service sector, this study focuses on more broadly dened skill groups, for which the distribution is similar.
Using the information from the UK and Irish data sources, the number of emigrants per skill group ij is calculated as uses immigration as an instrument for labor supply. For the current study, the corresponding instrument would be emigration from Lithuania. To be valid as an instrument, it has to be uncorrelated with labor demand over and above the correlation absorbed by the dummies and interaction terms in the estimating equation (5). However, in light of the scale of the emigration wave following EU enlargement, the emigration of workers of a specic skill group could also shift the demand for workers in this particular group.
To overcome the problem of identication in the presence of simultaneity bias, I propose a new instrument for labor supply, birth cohort size, which follows the logic that the size of a birth cohort should be highly correlated with labor supply today. The sign of the correlation depends on the 18 Ottaviano & Peri (2012) use the number of working hours from workers in this skill cell as a measure for labor input, which is more accurate than the number of workers. However, given that the HBS does not include data on working hours, the number of workers serves as a proxy.
labor supply behavior of dierent age cohorts: if all cohorts have equal employment-to-population rates, one would expect a positive correlation between the size of a birth cohort and the size of a skill group; while on the other hand, if older workers have a lower labor force participation than young workers, and at the same time birth rates were higher in earlier years, it is possible that the correlation between birth cohort size and the size of a skill group is negative.
19 The instrument naturally varies across experience groups, but also across education groups, as workers with a third-level education were born 5 years before workers with a lower secondary education with the same amount of work experience.
To ensure validity as an instrument, the size of a birth cohort must not be correlated with labor demand today, over and above the deterministic factors already controlled for in the rst stage. In other words, the size of a birth cohort 50 years ago may well be correlated with contemporaneous demand shifters such as physical capital or total factor productivity, but these correlations are absorbed in the rst stage with the time dummies δ t . The only possible violation of the exclusion restriction would be an impact of the birth cohort size on the stochastic part of the estimating equation, the error term ε ijt . However, it is implausible that the size of a birth cohort, which was determined at least 18 years ago, leads to a stochastic shift in labor demand today. Figure 2 shows the number of births per year from 1945 to 1984, the years in which most workers in the sample were born. As can be seen, older cohorts were larger. Moreover, there is a large variation in the number of births over time, which can potentially be exploited in the IV regressions. The data in this time series is annual, while the observations in the sample are skill groups that consist of 10 subsequent age cohorts, and thus the question arises as to which measure predicts the number of workers of a skill group today most accurately. There are three options: 1) the total number of births; 2) the average number of births; and 3) the median number of births per skill group. As an example, take the skill group upper secondary education, 0-10 years of work experience in the HBS of 2002. This skill group consists of 11 birth cohorts, born
19
Naturally, the size of a birth cohort is not a perfect predictor for the labor supply today, because it does not take into account demographic factors such as emigration, deaths or early retirement. However, as long as the birth cohort size is suciently correlated with labor supply, it is suitable as an instrument. The choice of the instrument depends on its statistical power, i.e. the correlation of the instrument with the endogenous regressor. As it turns out in the rst-stage regressions, the total number and average number of births are only weakly correlated with labor supply, and
consequently cannot be used as instruments.
20 The F-Statistic of the median number of births is 16.085, which is a suciently high correlation of the instrument with the endogenous regressor.
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The F-Statistics are 0.358 for the average number of births and 0.212 for the total number of births.
The reason for the weak correlation of the rst two instruments is their sensitivity to outliers in the number of births. As can be seen in Figure 2 , the number of births was subject to high uctuations and the sum and average are sensitive to large changes in the number of births.
These jumps dilute the ability of the instruments to predict the labor supply of a whole 10-year skill group. However, the median is not sensitive to such jumps, and hence it represents a better predictor for labor supply. Note: The table shows the estimation results for the elasticity of substitution between workers of dierent experience groups, σ EXP (Equation 5), which is computed as the negative inverse of the coecients. Controls are as in Equation (5). Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Table 3 reports the estimation results for σ EXP , with all regressions weighted with sampling weights. While I report the OLS results for comparison, as previously explained, they are not reliable owing to simultaneity bias. Column (2) displays the results of the 2SLS estimation, using birth cohort size as an instrument. The rst stage coecient is negative, indicating that older cohorts, who were larger in number than younger cohorts, are associated with fewer workers today.
With an F-Statistic of 16, the instrument has sucient power. The IV estimate is −0.63, which implies a σ EXP of 1.58.
The econometric analysis may prompt a number of concerns. Firstly, skill groups may be serially correlated over time, which can be accounted for using clustering of the standard errors at the education-experience level. However, as there are only 12 clusters, the asymptotic properties of the clustered standard errors can be problematic (Angrist & Pischke, 2009) . Column (3) reports clustered standard errors, highlighting that clustering increases the standard errors minimally, yet decreases the power of the instrument. Another problem is the small number of observations, as with 4 available survey rounds and 12 skill groups, the results are based on 48 observations. Nevertheless, note that the coecients in Table 3 Columns 2) and 3) are precisely estimated, and the statistical signicance is robust to the clustering of standard errors. The estimated parameter of 1.58 will enter the baseline simulations in the next section, but as I will show, the results hold qualitatively they have the same sign yet the eects are smaller if I use values from studies on other countries such as Germany and the UK.
The estimating equation (5) does not contain an interaction time*experience, which could bias the results if the relative productivity of an experience group changes over time. This could represent an issue if there is a positive selection of emigrants within an experience group; namely if workers with better unobservable characteristics leave, the remaining workers are on average less productive. As shown by column (4) in Table 3 , the point estimate does not dier substantially from the baseline, although the instrument has less power due to the high degree of saturation.
Columns (5) to (7) report the results of further robustness checks. The regression in Column (5) is based on men only, and thus addresses a potential concern about dierent labor supply behavior between men and women. Furthermore, the data contains no information on work hours per week, and men are typically more likely to work full time than women. Columns (6) and (7) leave out the youngest and oldest age groups (18-20 years, and 56-64 years), which only leads to a small change in the estimates of σ EXP .
Concerns might arise regarding the validity of the exclusion restriction in the estimation of σ EXP , given the negative coecient in the rst stage stems from a combination of old workers having large birth cohorts and at the same time lower labor force participation than young work-ers. The Online Appendix A.4 presents estimates based on alternative instrumental variables emigration from Lithuania, and emigration from Poland. For both instruments, the estimated elasticity of substitution falls in the same range as the estimates using birth cohort size as an instrument. Moreover, the baseline specication yields the same result as the reduced-form result in Elsner (2011) . In sum, the IV estimates yield an elasticity between old and young workers in the range between 1.47 and 1.71. Despite the small number of observations, the coecients can be estimated with reasonable precision, and the estimates are robust to dierent sample selections and instrumental variables.
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The estimates for σ EXP in the baseline scenario are lower in magnitude than those found in previous studies using a similar model for the United States, the UK and Germany. For the US, the estimates range between 3.5 found by Borjas (2003) that workers with dierent work experience are less substitutable in Lithuania than in Germany, the UK or the United States, with this smaller value being plausible for two reasons. First, the aforementioned studies estimate a long-run elasticity between skill groups, while I estimate a short-run elasticity. In the long run, workers of any age can adjust their skills to changes in the labor market, which is not possible in the short run. Consequently, any two skill groups are closer substitutes in the long run than in the short run.
A second reason lies in the history of the country. Given that Lithuania was part of the Soviet Union until 1990, older workers received their education and gathered their rst work experience in a centrally-planned economy, whereas younger workers were educated and grew up in the environment of a market economy. Consequently, the skills of young workers should be immediately applicable to the labor market, whereas older workers may need some time for adjustment and re-training, which can lead to a low degree of substitutability between old and
The Online Appendix A.4 also presents estimates for 5-year and 20-year experience groups.
young workers. A recent paper by Brunello et al. (2012) backs this explanation, showing that men who were educated under socialism in transition countries have lower returns to education than those who were educated under a free market economy.
The low degree of substitutability between old and young workers is also reected in the occupational distribution, with a lower correlation in the occupational distribution between old and young workers in Lithuania (ρ = 0.7) than in Germany or the UK (in both ρ = 0.95). Accordingly, this means that old and young workers are more likely to work in the same occupations in the UK and Germany than in Lithuania.
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5.2
Estimation of σ ED
As a next step, I estimate the elasticity of substitution between education groups, σ ED . Because the model is based on a nested CES production function, and education groups are on a higher nest than experience groups, estimating this parameter requires a higher level of aggregation, resulting in a lower number of observations.
With an estimation based on only 12 observations, it will not be possible to provide a precise and credible estimate for σ ED . While estimating σ ED , or at least determining reasonable values for it, is not an end in itself, σ ED will enter the simulations of the migration wave on real wages.
Therefore, the importance of precise estimates depends on the importance of σ ED for the wage changes: the larger the role of dierent education groups in the migration wave, the more important it is to obtain a precise estimate for σ ED . As shown in the previous section, Table 2 , the emigration rates are very similar across education groups, yet dier considerably across experience groups. Therefore, the parameter that matters most for the simulations is σ EXP , while the value of σ ED should not have a large inuence on the simulated wage changes.
To nd a sensible value for σ ED , I propose two solutions. First, I use a very large (σ ED → ∞) and a very small value (σ ED = 1) for the simulations, and demonstrate how the simulated wage
22
These results are based on the European Labour Force Survey, including employees in 9 one-digit occupational categories (variable ISCO1D). The results are similar for other years.
changes dier accordingly. Second, to obtain some value for the baseline scenario, I estimate σ ED based on the available data, with the estimation equation for this parameter derived in the same way as equation (5),
in which δ t is a vector of year dummies and δ it is a vector of interactions between education and year dummies.w it is the average real wage paid to education group i at time t.L it is a labor input calculated from the composite in equation (3).
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In theory, σ ED can be identied from equation (7). However, owing to the small number of observations, it is not possible to identify σ ED without imposing further restrictions. Otherwise, the model would be too saturated and the coecient for −1/σ ED cannot be statistically distinguished from zero. 7), which is calculated as the negative inverse of the estimated coecients. Robust standard errors in brackets. Signicance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table 4 shows the results of the OLS regressions. Surprisingly, the coecients are highly
The γ ij are calculated from the coecients of the δ ij in equation (3) with ij = 11 as the base category, so
signicant in the rst 3 specications, and only when δ ij is approximated by linear time trends is the model too saturated to produce a signicant coecient. Despite the caveats that apply to these estimates, σ ED lies within the range found in other studies. Krusell et al. (2000) , as well as Ciccone & Peri (2005) estimate a σ ED of 1.5, Borjas (2003) 1.3 and Card & Lemieux (2001) 2.25.
6
Simulation of Wage Effects
Simulation Equation
In this section, I simulate the emigration shock that occurred after EU enlargement in this labor market, calculating the new equilibrium wage for each skill group. The calculated wage change is the dierence between the equilibrium wages before and after the migration shock, and the results of this simulation have a ceteris paribus interpretation. The fundamental structure of the labor market is held constant, so that the simulations yield the change in wages in absence of other adjustment channels. To obtain the simulation equation, I dierentiate equation (4) 24 and drop the time subscripts
Figure 3 
. s i denotes the income share of education group i and s ij denotes the income share of skill group ij. s i and s ij are calculated from the sampling weights in the HBS using the information on all men and women in the sample. The ∆s measure the change in a variable from 2002 to 2006. 25 In the Online Appendix A.5.2 Figure 7 I draw 1 σ ED from a uniform distribution between zero and one, in order that σ ED ∈ [0, ∞]. Despite the wider condence bands, the wage increases for the youngest group are statistically signicant).
A general pattern emerges, whereby emigration caused an increase in the wages of young workers, while the wages of old workers decreased. Young workers gained between 5.5% and 8.2% from emigration, whereas for workers with a work experience between 10 and 30 years, the model predicts wage changes close to zero, except for workers with a lower secondary education. Old workers with more than 30 years of work experience lost around 1% from emigration.
These results suggest that emigration had a signicant impact on the wage distribution between old and young workers, with the youngest cohort becoming signicantly smaller and this change in the composition of the workforce changing the wage structure. Despite most of the predicted wage changes being statistically signicant, only the wage changes for young workers are of economic signicance. This can be seen when comparing the simulated wage changes caused by migration with the total wages changes for Lithuanian workers between 2002 and 2006 in Figure 1 . The wages of all groups increased by between 20% and 80%, so that emigration can explain between 10% and 30% of the wage changes of young workers; however, the wage changes of workers with a work experience higher than 10 years are solely driven by other factors, such as domestic and foreign investment or productivity growth.
Having noted that the predicted wage changes dier considerably between young and old workers, the question arises as to which factors drive these results within the model. Due to the nested structure of the production function, there is a variety of channels through which a labor supply shock can aect wages, and the Online Appendix A.6 presents a decomposition of the wage changes into an own-wage eect and higher-order eects. Section A.7 in the online appendix compares the predicted wage changes from the structural model with wage changes predicted by a simple reduced-form analysis, clearly showing the importance of higher-order eects for the overall eect of emigration on wages. The large eects predicted by the own-wage elasticity are dampened by changes in the composition of the workforce, and a general decrease in labor demand due to a smaller consumer base. For skill groups with a predicted wage change equal or close to zero, the positive own-wage eect and negative higher-order eects balance each other out.
The wage eects found in this section are consistent with a story of an increase in bargaining power. Emigration of similar workers renders stayers a more scarce resource, thus resulting in higher wages. Another explanation could lie in the dierence in the occupational distribution of old and young workers. Accordingly, if young workers tend to work in sectors with a high exibility of work contracts and a high uctuation of employees, they are more likely to switch to a better-paid job once emigration leads to labor shortages in the sector. This possibility should be more likely in the service sector, which only evolved in Lithuania in the last 15-20 years, and less likely in the manufacturing sector or agriculture. I elaborate on this further in Online Appendix A.8, showing that young workers were indeed over-represented in occupations that are generally associated with greater exibility.
To show the sensitivity of the results to changes in key parameters, I conduct a series of robustness checks that are presented in the online appendix. For the calculation of emigrants per skill group, I assumed the skill distribution of emigrants going to Ireland to be the same as that of emigrants going to the UK. Section A.5.1 shows the simulations based on Irish data only, while Section A.5.2 re-calibrates the model using dierent elasticities of substitution. The rst exercise produces standard errors for sigma ED being uniformly distributed on the interval [0, ∞], whereas the second exercise uses parameter value from studies on other countries (US, UK, Germany) that use a similar empirical strategy, showing how the choice of parameters changes the predicted wage changes.
Conclusion
This paper exploits the large and sudden emigration wave from Eastern Europe after EU enlargement in 2004 to study how emigration aects the wages of non-migrants. Using Lithuanian microdata, I nd that emigration signicantly changed the wage distribution, causing an increase in wages on average; however, the wage eect was concentrated among young workers, whose wages increased by around 6% over the period of 5 years, while the wages of older workers were not aected. Contrary to previous literature (Borjas, 2003; Aydemir & Borjas, 2007; Docquier et al., 2011) , I nd no signicant eect of emigration on the wage distribution between highand low-skilled workers. The dierence in the wage eects of dierent experience groups can be explained by the demographics of the emigration wave, which mostly consisted of young workers from all education groups.
The quasi-experimental character of EU enlargement allows me to study an important issue of immigration policy. Most high-income countries have strict immigration laws in place, thus restricting migration from low-and middle-income countries. Given the large wage dierentials between high-income countries and the rest, lifting these barriers to migration results in substantial migration ows, which have welfare impacts on both the sending and receiving countries. The "EU enlargement experiment" represents a rare example of the lifting of migration restrictions, and shows that workers in middle-income countries respond to the opening of labor markets in high-income countries, with between 6 and 9% of the workforce of Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia having emigrated to the UK and Ireland. Moreover, the most mobile workers have higher emigration rates. For instance, young workers are typically more mobile and have lower moving costs than old workers. In this light, it is unsurprising that emigrants were on average 13 years younger than non-migrant workers in Eastern Europe. This paper should also encourage further research on the absorption of labor supply shocks in countries of origin. A growing body of literature shows how receiving countries absorb labor supply shocks (Hanson & Slaughter (2002) , Gandal et al. (2004) , among others), nding that changes in labor supply caused by immigration are not absorbed through changes in wages, but rather through shifts in production technologies within industries. While this paper has shown that wage responses can be an important absorption channel in countries of origin, further research is needed to determine which other channels are important in countries of origin, and especially in low-and middle-income countries.
